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For the past 15 years, China has been engaged in a concerted effort tomodernise and upgrade its armed forces. These modernisation activ-ities have several objectives. For one thing, as China strives to be-
come a global power, it is increasingly seeking “hard” power, i.e., military
strength, commensurate with its growing economic, diplomatic, and cul-
tural “soft” power. Second, Beijing appears to be more prone to use military
force (or the threat of military force) to defend and promote its regional
interests, such as its territorial claims in the South China Sea or protecting
local sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) vital to its energy supplies and
trade; consequently, building up that military wherewithal is instrumental
to this strategy. Third, it aspires to increase its military capacities in order
to keep the pressure on Taiwan not to declare independence and to even-
tually accept some kind of reunification with the mainland; at the same
time, China wants to reduce the willingness of the United States to inter-
vene on behalf of Taiwan in case of a cross-Strait military clash by raising
the costs of involvement for the US. Fourth, China wants to increase its ca-
pacities for military operations other than war (MOOTW) so as to defend
its growing interests around the world, to which end it is participating
more in activities such as peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assis-
tance and disaster relief operations, and anti-piracy operations. Finally,
China overall seeks military power to mitigate the rising American military
presence in the Asia-Pacific, and to establish itself as a credible rival to the
United States in this region.
These efforts have paid remarkable dividends, and since the late 1990s
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has made substantial progress in trans-
forming itself into a modern fighting force; in many areas, it is practically
unrecognisable compared to the PLA that existed before 1997. The impact
of this transformation has been particularly noticeable in the past few
years in the form of a much more assertive, even aggressive, China, in-
creasingly willing to use its military to protect and advance its national in-
terests. Prominent examples of this increased use of the PLA as an instru-
ment of national policy include the dispatch of PLA Navy vessels to fight
piracy in the Gulf of Aden, and the PLAN’s recent launching of an aircraft
carrier. What the end result of this military modernisation process will be,
or how China may further use its growing military power, is still an open
question.
1997 is a good place to start when addressing the current modernisation
of the PLA, as this was a watershed year in the history of the Chinese mil-
itary. Starting that year, for instance, Chinese defence spending began its
remarkable (and, except for one year, unbroken) run of double-digit real
annual growth (after adjusting for inflation), which underwrote the process
of military modernisation that was to follow. Also in 1997, the decision
was made by the central government to force the PLA to divest itself of
the bulk of its commercial activities so as to concentrate on its primary
functions – deterrence, compellence, and if necessary, war-fighting. (1) At
the 15th Party congress in September 1997, the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) decided to radically reform the state-owned enterprise (SOE) sector,
which marked the beginning of the current process of restructuring and
upgrading the Chinese defence industry. Finally, 1997 was also around the
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time the PLA officially adopted the strategic concept of fighting “limited
local wars under high-technology conditions” (and later, “under conditions
of informatisation,” or the addition of computers and information-sharing
networks to military platforms), which still drives current operational and
hardware requirements for military modernisation.
This article traces the process of Chinese military modernisation over the
past 15 years (1997-2012), focusing on its drivers and enablers, the recap-
italisation of the armed forces with more advanced military hardware, and
changes in PLA training, recruitment, and retention. It then assesses the
progress that the PLA has made over this period in transforming itself into
a more modern military force, where it still faces challenges, and how, in
the end, a more powerful PLA may impact the regional military balance.
Tying military modernisation to
requirements: Chinese defence strategy in
the twenty-first century
China’s defence strategy is largely laid out in its National Military Strate-
gic Guidelines, a set of overall principles for planning and managing the de-
velopment and use of the PLA. According to the Annual Report to Congress
on Military Power of the People’s Republic of China by the US Department
of Defense (DoD), the critical “operational component” and “highest-level
strategic guidance for all PLA activities” is “active defence” ( jiji fangyu
积极防御 ). The key elements of the PLA’s active defence doctrine are (1) a
defensive military strategy (permitting attacks only after having first been
attacked, although what constitutes an attack is left purposely vague, and
could include pre-emptive or even preventive strikes), with the goal of de-
fending CCP rule, national sovereignty, and territorial integrity; (2) a “for-
ward defence” posture; and (3) an operational doctrine that focuses on the
opposing force’s weaknesses, initiated only when “time and conditions…
favor [PLA] forces, and which does not limit the counter-offensive in terms
of time, space, or response.” (2)
At the same time, the goal of China’s defence program is to build a force
capable of fighting and winning “limited local wars under conditions of ‘in-
formatisation’.” (3) In such an environment, war-fighting will likely revolve
around short-duration, high-intensity conflicts characterised by agility,
speed, and long-range attack, employing joint operations fought simulta-
neously throughout the entire air, land, sea, space, and electromagnetic
battle space (i.e., five-dimensional warfare), and relying heavily upon ex-
tremely lethal high-technology weapons. Such an operational doctrine
also emphasises pre-emption, surprise, and “shock value,” given that the
earliest stages of conflict may be crucial to the outcome of a war. Conse-
quently, modern Chinese defence requirements stress mobility, flexibility,
power projection, precision-strike, and joint operations fought throughout
the entire battle space. 
In particular, “informatisation” ( xinxihua 信息化 ) means that informa-
tion technologies (IT), especially those capabilities relating to command,
control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and recon-
naissance (C4ISR), are considered paramount to expanding military effec-
tiveness. This entails, among other things, dominating the electromagnetic
spectrum through “integrated network electronic warfare” as well as ex-
ploiting technological advances in microelectronics, sensors, propulsion,
stealth, and special materials to outfit the PLA with precision-strike
weapons, including ballistic and anti-ship or land-attack cruise missiles. In
short, the PLA, in its long transition from “People’s War” to “limited local
wars under conditions of informatisation,” is seeking to move from being
a platform-centric to a more network-centric force, or one where the cru-
cial characteristic of the force is the network linkages among platforms as
opposed to the platforms themselves. (4)
Improvements in the PLA’s capability to conduct “high-intensity, regional
military operations” have increasingly enabled the Chinese armed forces to
pose what US military analysts refer to as an “anti-access/area-denial”
(A2/AD) threat. The PLA’s capacity for A2/AD is intended to threaten a po-
tential enemy’s ability to enter or operate freely in a war zone. “Anti-ac-
cess” is typically described as attacks on air or naval bases using ballistic
and cruise missiles, fighter-bombers, and special operations forces, while
“area denial” operations are efforts to deny outside (in this case, US) forces
the ability to enter into the Western Pacific by targeting the air and mar-
itime dimensions using anti-ship missiles and submarines. A2/AD is seen as
especially crucial in deterring or countering third-party interventions, par-
ticularly efforts on the part of the US military to come to the aid of Taiwan
in the case of a cross-Strait crisis. (5)
At the same time, the PLA is in the midst of a shift from simpler types of
joint operations (JO) to more advanced and complicated integrated joint
operations (IJO). For the PLA, joint operations usually meant having at
least two different services arriving at the same location at roughly the
same time, usually with one service supporting another; in such a situa-
tion, there was relatively little fusion when it came to things like command
and control. (6) Ultimately, however, the PLA is looking to transition beyond
joint operations to full-on integrated joint operations. IJO, aided by the
promise of informatisation, would enable the PLA to engage in flexible, de-
ployable, mobile, and multiservice military operations, perhaps even in-
cluding non-PLA forces such as paramilitary organisations and local police
forces. IJO will require the PLA to master a new type of command and con-
trol system entailing seamless information-sharing, multilevel synchroni-
sation in the decision-making process, and real-time response. (7) To date,
these capabilities are still aspirational, yet they are driving the overall di-
rection towards which modernisation is oriented.
Enabler of Chinese military modernisation #1:
Rising defence spending
The considerable modernisation of PLA capabilities has been underwrit-
ten by the tremendous and sustained growth in Chinese military expendi-
tures over the past decade and a half. China has experienced double-digit
real growth in defence spending nearly every year since the late 1990s.
Even according to its own official national statistics, which most expert
observers believe substantially understate spending levels, China’s defence
budget from 1999 to 2008 expanded at a rate of 16.2 percent per
annum. (8) Most recently, in March 2011, Beijing announced that it would
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allocate 601 billion RMB, or US$91.5 billion for defence, an increase of
12.7 percent over 2010. Indeed, the 2010 defence budget of RMB532.1 bil-
lion (US$81 billion) was itself 7.5 percent greater than 2009’s RMB481 bil-
lion (US$70.3 billion) defence budget, which was in turn 14.9 percent
larger than the 2008 defence budget. Overall, since 1997, Chinese military
expenditures have increased at least 600 percent in real terms. As a result,
since the late 1990s, China has moved from having a military budget
smaller than Taiwan’s to being the second-largest defence spender in the
world, outstripping Japan, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom. Today,
only the United States spends more than China on defence.
Its dramatically expanded commitment to funding defence expenditures
has allowed China to devote considerable resources to procurement and
defence industrial research and development (R&D). While all categories of
Chinese military spending, including personnel, training, and operations,
have increased significantly over the past 15 years, nowhere has Beijing’s
munificence been more notable, or more alarming to its neighbours, than
in the PLA’s budget for equipment acquisitions. According to its biannual
defence white papers, Beijing has consistently allocated approximately
one-third of its military expenditures over the past decade and a half to
equipment purchases. This compares very favourably with most other
countries. France, for example, apportioned 27 percent of its 2009 defence
budget to equipment and R&D, while the United Kingdom dedicated 26
percent, and Germany only 17 percent. (9) In 2010, only 17.5 percent of all
Japanese defence-related expenditures went to buying equipment, along
with only 2.5 percent for defence R&D. (10) In real terms, PLA annual spend-
ing on equipment procurement has increased from around US$3.1 billion
in 1997 to an estimated US$30.5 billion in 2011; of this, perhaps US$4 to
6 billion is dedicated to defence R&D. This likely makes China the second
highest spender in the world in terms of spending on procurement, and at
least the third highest when it comes to defence R&D. (11)
If anything has supported China’s recent expansion in military power, it
is this explosion in defence spending, which has permitted the PLA to ac-
quire new surface combatants and submarines, modern fighter jets, air-to-
air refuelling aircraft, satellites, unmanned aerial vehicles, and a host of
ballistic, cruise, and tactical missile systems. Additionally, expanding de-
fence budgets have allowed China to fund an array of new military R&D
projects, such as its J-20 fifth-generation fighter, its DF-21D anti-ship bal-
listic missile (ASBM), and its nuclear submarine program.
As noted above, most expert observers believe that the official budget
released by the Chinese every year accounts for only a fraction of actual
defence spending. In particular, whole categories of military expenditure
are believed to be missing from official figures, including arms imports, ex-
penses for the People’s Armed Police (PAP) and militia/reserve forces, state
subsidies to China’s military-industrial complex, and earnings from PLA-
run businesses. How much all this extra-budgetary spending actually
amounts to has been the subject of considerable debate and analysis in
Western literature on the PLA, and unofficial estimates of “real” Chinese
defence expenditures have ranged from anywhere between one-and-a-
half to as high as ten times greater than the official budget. (12) The US
DoD, for example, has asserted that China’s actual military expenditures
are at least twice the officially stated figure (though the DoD provides no
methodology or criteria for arriving at this figure). (13) In fact, the actual
amount of extra-budgetary spending may actually be quite small com-
pared to the publicly announced defence budget – perhaps $2 billion to $4
billion. Nevertheless, even such a small amount could be significant when
it comes to underwriting certain Chinese military activities, particularly in-
ternal security, which is normally the purview of the PAP.
This upward trend is likely to continue for some time. In May 2006, for
example, Beijing approved a 15-year national development plan (2006-
2020) for defence science and technology, with the goal of “transforming
the PLA into a modernised, mechanised, IT-based force” by 2020. (14) This
program is intended to boost military R&D spending, focusing on high-
technology weapons systems (and specifically on “IT solutions”), support-
ing advanced manufacturing technologies, and cultivating collaborative in-
ternational defence R&D efforts. (15)
Enabler of Chinese military modernisation #2:
Defence industrial base reforms
Since the establishment of the People’s Republic, Beijing has striven to
become self-reliant in the development and production of armaments, and
accordingly it has created the largest military-industrial complex (MIC) in
Asia. The Chinese MIC comprises more a thousand SOEs, employing at
least one million workers, including several thousand scientists, engineers,
and technicians. In particular, China is one of the few countries in the
world to produce a full range of military equipment, from small arms to ar-
moured vehicles to fighter aircraft to warships and submarines, in addition
to nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.
Nevertheless, despite its ambitions and scope, China’s MIC has shown, for
most of its history, an unimpressive record of performance. As recently as
the late 1990s, China still possessed one of the most technologically back-
ward defence industries among the major powers of the world. Most indige-
nously developed weapons systems were at least 15 to 20 years behind
those of the West, and quality control was consistently poor. Moreover,
China’s defence R&D base was deficient in several critical areas, including
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aeronautics, jet propulsion, microelectronics, computers, and new materials.
Since around the turn of the century, however, China has made signifi-
cant progress in turning around its long-ailing defence sector. This is evi-
dent in the growing number of new types of weapons, increasingly of a
quality and capability comparable to Western systems. These include the
J-10 fighter, the Yuan-class diesel-electric submarine, the Type-052C de-
stroyer, and the HQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missile (akin to the US Pa-
triot). At the same time, China appears to have produced the world’s first
working anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), and it has test-flown a purport-
edly fifth-generation combat aircraft. Additionally, production and sales
are up throughout the Chinese MIC.
After decades of false starts and fitful progress, Beijing appears to have fi-
nally hit upon the right formula to reform and revitalise its MIC. Beginning
in the late 1990s, Beijing launched several initiatives intended to inject
more market-oriented incentives into the defence industrial sector, includ-
ing the introduction of Western management techniques, a new emphasis
on quality control, and greater oversight by the Chinese military when it
comes to procurement and program management. Efforts were also made
to rationalise the country’s bloated military-industrial complex, laying off
excess workers and consolidating production. China even injected a mod-
icum of competition, breaking up giant defence SOEs into smaller, contend-
ing firms, particularly in the aviation and shipbuilding sectors.
In addition, China has aggressively pursued a dual-use R&D strategy that
stresses the development of advanced civilian technologies – particularly
in the areas of electronics and information technologies, aviation, space
launch vehicles, satellites, and advanced manufacturing – that can be
spun-on to defence products and production. Over the past decade, Beijing
has worked hard both to encourage further domestic development and
growth in these sectors and to expand linkages and collaboration between
China’s MIC and civilian high-technology sectors, and this approach ap-
pears to be paying dividends. (16)
Finally, the reform of the defence industry must be seen as building on
the expansion of state funding committed to defence modernisation more
broadly. Arguably, simply throwing more money at the problem may have
had the greatest impact on the local defence industry, by increasing pro-
curement and therefore production; by expanding R&D spending; and by
subsidising the upgrading and modernisation of arms-manufacturing facil-
ities. Consequently, China’s MIC is better suited than ever to absorb and
leverage advanced, militarily relevant technologies and therefore provide
the PLA with the advanced military systems it requires. In fact, in recent
years Beijing has greatly reduced its once-sizable arms purchases from
Russia, an indicator that China is getting closer to realising its long-cher-
ished goal of self-sufficiency in arms acquisition.
At the same time, critical weaknesses remain. China’s MIC still appears to
possess only limited indigenous capabilities for cutting-edge defence R&D,
and Western armaments producers continue to outpace China when it
comes to most military technologies, particularly in areas such as propul-
sion and defence electronics. Overall, it is still more of a “fast follower” and
niche innovator when it comes to military R&D, though this may be irrel-
evant if China is only looking to gain asymmetric niche advantages such as
using an ASBM to attack aircraft carriers. Nevertheless, the Chinese de-
fence industrial base has made undeniable advancements over the past
decade and a half in terms of manufacturing new, relatively modern mili-
tary systems, and this pace of defence development and production could
even quicken in the decades ahead as the lessons of these reforms are in-
corporated further.
China’s military build-up, 1997-2012
With constantly expanding defence resources, the PLA has been engaged
in a concerted effort to replace and upgrade its military hardware since at
least the late 1990s. Initially, Beijing relied heavily on foreign suppliers, par-
ticularly Russia, Ukraine, and to a lesser extent Israel, to meet its immedi-
ate requirements for advanced armaments. Since the turn of the century,
however, the PRC has increasingly turned to its own indigenous defence
industry to provide the PLA with modern weaponry – supplementing this
capacity with technologies that have either been reverse-engineered (for
example, the J-11B fighter, a clone of the Russian Su-27) or stolen outright
from foreign suppliers (e.g., stealth and information technologies).
Consequently, it is reasonable to argue that Beijing has been engaged in
something more than the “mere” modernisation of its armed forces over
the past decade and a half. The PLA has not just undergone certain quali-
tative improvements, but in many cases it has added capabilities that it did
not possess before, such as stealth, standoff precision-strike, long-range
airborne and undersea attack, and expeditionary warfare. In addition, these
new war-fighting capabilities have been further enhanced by significant
improvements in Chinese military C4ISR infrastructure, including satellites,
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and computer networking. For this rea-
son, it is fair to describe China’s military improvements as a “build-up”
rather simply a “modernisation drive.”
Recent Chinese military thinking has been particularly influenced by the
so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA) and concepts of network-cen-
tric warfare (NCW). Many in the PLA see considerable potential for force
multipliers in such areas as information warfare, the digitisation of the bat-
tlefield, and networked systems. (17) At the same time, adversaries who are
highly dependent on advanced technology – such as the United States –
are seen as susceptible to low-tech countermeasures or attacks on their
own command, control, and communications capabilities. Consequently,
the PLA has devoted increasing attention to the development of asymmet-
ric responses aimed at enabling “the inferior to defeat the superior.”
In particular, China’s military is increasingly focused on the information-
technologies side of the RMA. According to PLA expert You Ji, the Chinese
military is currently engaged as part of an ambitious “generation-leap”
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strategy in a twin transformational effort to simultaneously pursue both
the mechanisation and informatisation of its armed forces. (18) Thus, even
as it is attempting to upgrade its current arsenal of conventional industrial
age weapons, it is also seeking to incorporate improved communications
systems and other high technology capabilities that will enable it to fight
informatised conflicts by leveraging net-centric concepts of integration
and rapid information exchange.
Of particular note over the past decade and a half has been the PLA’s
pursuit of weapons for asymmetric warfare, sometimes referred to as “as-
sassin’s mace” or “trump card” capabilities. (19) Some of these weapons are
designed to strike an enemy’s vulnerabilities, such as using computer-net-
work attacks to knock out overhead C4ISR capabilities. Others are basically
“old wine in new bottles,” that is, existing programs such as fighter-
bombers, missiles, submarines, and smart mines that are nevertheless re-
garded as the most effective weapons in the PLA’s arsenal and whose de-
velopment or deployment has therefore been accelerated. Finally, this cat-
egory of weapons also includes so-called “new concept” arms, such as ki-
netic energy weapons (e.g., railguns), lasers, radiofrequency and high-pow-
ered microwave weapons, and anti-satellite (ASAT) systems. Most military
systems in this last category are still in development, although China did
successfully test an ASAT device in 2007. (20)
With regard to its naval forces, China built six destroyers of three differ-
ent types between 2000 and 2011, including one class (the Type-052C
Luyang-II) outfitted with an Aegis-type air-defence radar and fire-control
system; additional Type-052C destroyers are currently under construction.
These vessels are equipped with the indigenous YJ-83 or YJ-62 anti-ship
cruise missile (ASCM) and the HN-2 land-attack cruise missile (a variant
of the Russian Kh-55 missile). The Type-052C also carries several Chinese-
built HHQ-9 surface-to-air missiles (SAM), housed in vertical launch sys-
tems (VLS). China has also added at least a dozen new frigates to its forces,
including the Type-054 Jiangkai-class, which features a stealthy design and
is armed with ASCMs and VLS-deployed SAMs, as well as the new-genera-
tion Type-022 Houbei-class catamaran-hulled missile fast attack craft
(outfitted with YJ-83 ASCMs), of which at least 60 have been built.
Rounding out its modern surface fleet, in the late 1990s and early 2000s,
the PLA Navy (PLAN) also acquired four Sovremenny-class destroyers
from Russia. Of particular note, these ships are outfitted with the 3M-80E
Moskit (NATO designation: SS-N-22 Sunburn) ramjet-powered, supersonic
ASCM, which has a range of 120 kilometres; later-model Sunburns have a
200-kilometre range.
China has also greatly expanded its submarine fleet over the past 15
years. Since the late 1990s, the PLAN has acquired 13 Type-039 Song-class
diesel-electric submarines. The Song-class is the first Chinese-built subma-
rine to feature a modern “Albacore” (or teardrop-shaped) hull and a skewed
propeller (for improved quieting), and to carry an encapsulated ASCM ca-
pable of being fired while submerged (through a regular torpedo tube), as
well as an antisubmarine rocket. The PLAN further upgraded its capabilities
by fielding the Type-41 Yuan-class in 2005. The Yuan-class also carries both
torpedoes and ASCMs, and some or all of the boats in this class may be
equipped with an as-yet unidentified engine (perhaps the Stirling engine,
which has been outfitted to Swedish and Japanese submarines) for air-in-
dependent propulsion (AIP). So far, four Yuan-class submarines have been
built, with at least three more under construction. On top of these indige-
nously-produced vessels, beginning in the mid-1990s, the PRC acquired 12
Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines from Russia. Some of these are armed
with the 3M-54E Klub (SS-N-27) ASCM and the 53-65KE wake-homing tor-
pedo. According to some reports, some of the features found in the Kilo
were incorporated into the Yuan-class submarine.
Furthermore, the PLAN has begun replacing its small and aging fleet of
nuclear-powered submarines, i.e., five Han-class nuclear-powered attack
boats (SSN) and one Xia-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile-carrying
submarine (SSBN). The first in a new class of SSNs, the Type-093 Shang-
class was launched in 2002 and commissioned in 2006; one additional
Type-093 has since also entered service, and some sources estimate that
up to eight boats in this class could be built, though other analysts expect
that the PLAN will field more advanced Type-095s instead. (21) The PLAN
has also launched two new SSBNs of the Type-094 Jin-class, each intended
to carry 12 JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with a
range of 7,000 kilometres (three times greater than that of the JL-1 SLBM
carried by the Xia) once the JL-2 enters operational readiness. (22)
China is also in the process of expanding its capacities for force projec-
tion and expeditionary warfare, in particular involving the acquisition of
platforms capable of operating fixed-wing aircraft. China has recently
launched two Type-071 17,000-20,000 ton LPD (landing platform dock)
amphibious warfare ships, capable of carrying two helicopters and two air-
cushioned landing craft (LCAC) each, as well as carrying up to 800 troops.
Up to eight Type-071s are likely to be built, and some observers have spec-
ulated that these may be complemented by a new larger LPH (landing
platform helicopter) amphibious assault ship. (23)
In perhaps its most dramatic development, the PLAN has recently taken
delivery of China’s first aircraft carrier: the rebuilt Soviet carrier ex-Varyag.
A casualty of the Cold War’s end, the Varyag was laid down in the early
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Song-class submarine.
Credits: military-today.com
1980s, but construction was halted in 1992 when the vessel was only 70
percent complete. Ukraine, which inherited it after the breakup of the
Soviet Union, stripped the ship bare and left it exposed to the elements
for several years. When the Varyag was finally sold and delivered to China
in 2001 – ostensibly to be turned into a Macau casino – it was a rusted
shell without engines, a rudder, a weapons systems, or electronics. In ad-
dition, the process of removing sensitive equipment from the vessel had
resulted in damage to its structure, so that even its seaworthiness was
questioned by some. In mid-2005, however, the Chinese moved the
Varyag to dry-dock at the Dalian shipyard in northeast China, where it
underwent substantial repairs and reconstruction, along with the instal-
lation of new engines, radars, and electrical systems. The rebuilt ex-
Varyag carrier underwent its first sea trials under PLAN colours in August
2011.
At the moment, China still lacks carrier-capable fixed-wing aircraft. At
one time, the PLAN was rumoured to be interested in purchasing 50 Su-
33 fighter jets from Russia, which are flown off Moscow’s lone remaining
carrier, the Admiral Kusnetzov; this sale never materialised, however. Cur-
rently, it is believed that the ex-Varyag will fly either the so-called J-15
fighter jet (reportedly reversed-engineered from a Su-33 acquired surrep-
titiously from Ukraine) or a navalised version of the indigenous J-10 com-
bat fighter.
The ex-Varyag vessel will likely initially be used more as a research and
training platform for future Chinese carrier designs and crews rather than
as a fully functioning carrier (although it could be pressed into military
service in a limited capacity). China is expected by most naval power an-
alysts to begin construction of several indigenous carriers soon. At one
time, the Jane’s Information Group speculated that the PLAN could build
up to six aircraft carriers. If that happens, it would likely mean the reori-
entation of the PLAN around Carrier Battle Groups (CVBGs), with the car-
rier at the heart of a constellation of supporting submarines, destroyers,
and frigates – an amalgamation of power projection capabilities such as
China has never before possessed. Such CVBGs are among the most im-
pressive instruments of military power in terms of sustained, far-reaching,
and expeditionary offensive force, and such a development would consti-
tute a major shift in the PLAN’s strategic direction away from mere near-
coast defence.
Modernisation efforts for the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and the naval avia-
tion forces of the PLA Navy (often referred to as the PLA Navy Air Force,
or PLANAF) have focused on the acquisition of modern fighter aircraft
with advanced air-to-air missiles (AAMs) and air-to-ground weapons, as
well as long-range surface-to-air missile systems (which the PLAAF man-
ages as a part of its overall responsibilities for China’s air defences). The
PLAAF and PLANAF have, over the past 15 years, acquired a large number
of so-called “fourth-generation” or “fourth-generation-plus” fighter air-
craft, capable of firing standoff active radar-guided medium-range air-to-
air missiles or delivering precision-guided air-to-surface munitions. Begin-
ning in 1992, for example, China began to import the Russian-built Su-27
Flanker fighter jet; this was subsequently complemented by the purchase
of the more advanced Su-30MKK version (first for the PLANAF and later
for the PLAAF), and Beijing and Moscow eventually agreed to an arrange-
ment to license-produce the Su-27 (designated the J-11A) at the
Shenyang Aircraft Company. All together, the PLAAF and PLANAF have ac-
quired approximately 300 Su-27s and Su-30MKKs, including around 100 J-
11As. Additionally, since the early 2000s, the Chinese have been manufac-
turing a reverse-engineered version of the Su-27 (designated the J-11B),
albeit still relying on a Russian-supplied engine.
China is also currently manufacturing its first indigenous fourth-genera-
tion-plus combat aircraft, the J-10. The J-10 is an agile fighter jet in
roughly the same class as the F-16C, and it features fly-by-wire flight con-
trols and a glass cockpit (but nevertheless equipped with the Russian AL-
31 engine, underscoring China’s continuing difficulties with developing a
usable jet engine). The J-10 first flew in the mid-1990s, and production
started around the turn of the century. At least 150 J-10s have been deliv-
ered to the PLAAF since the early 2000s, with production continuing at a
rate of about 30 aircraft a year; estimates are that the Chinese air force will
buy upwards to 300 of these aircraft. Altogether, by 2020, the PLAAF and
PLANAF will likely have between 600 and 700 combat aircraft of the
fourth-generation or later type.
All of these modern aircraft can fire advanced air-delivered weapons. The
PLAAF has purchased the RE-77E (AA-12) active-radar guided air-to-air
missile (AAM) for its Su-27s, while the Su-30s can be equipped with the
Russian-made Kh-31P anti-radiation missile (for use against radars). The J-
10 carries the Chinese-designed PL-12 active-radar AAM and the short-
range PL-8, a licensed-produced version of the Israeli Python-3 infrared-
guided AAM, as well as laser-guided and satellite-guided bombs, high-
speed anti-radar missiles, and air-launched cruise missiles.
In a move comparable to the launching of the country’s first aircraft car-
rier, China has recently unveiled a purportedly “fifth-generation” combat
aircraft, the J-20. The J-20, which had its first flight in January 2011, nom-
inally resembles the US F-22, although the actual details of this aircraft –
how stealthy is it, how advanced its radar and other avionics are, what kind
of sophisticated weaponry it carries, etc. – are sketchy. Consequently, one
should be careful not to read too much into this program. (24) At the same
time, the J-20 demonstrates China’s ambitions to enter the vanguard of
advanced fighter-jet producers.
More than most countries, the Chinese military relies heavily on ballistic
missile systems for long-range precision-strike, although these are increas-
ingly being supplemented by new land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs). Be-
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Varyag under tow in Istanbul in November 2011 on his way to
Macao. Obtained from the U.S. Naval War College report
"China's Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: Seeking Truth from Rumors.",
Naval War College Review, Winter 2004, Vol. 57, No. 1.
ginning in the mid-1990s, for example, China began acquiring convention-
ally-armed short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs, missiles with ranges of
less than 1,000 kilometres), mostly CSS-6/DF-15s and CSS-7/DF-11s, at a
rate of about 50 to 75 missiles a year. By late 2010, the PLA’s Second Ar-
tillery (the arm of the Chinese military that controls the country’s nuclear
and conventional missile forces) was estimated by the US DoD to have de-
ployed approximately 1,000 to 1,200 SRBMs, most of which were arrayed
opposite Taiwan. (25) China’s conventional ballistic missile capabilities,
moreover, have expanded into the medium-range category – that is, those
missiles with ranges between 1,000 and 3,000 kilometres. The more recent
versions of these missiles, such as the GPS-guided CSS-5/DF-21C, are be-
lieved to be accurate enough to hit targets such as airfields and ports, and
can carry a variety of warheads, including conventional high explosive,
anti-armour submunitions, and fuel air explosives. (26) In addition, China’s
Second Artillery has fielded around 150-350 conventional, ground-
launched LACMs, such as the DH-10, with a range of 2,000 kilometres or
more, that are even more accurate. (27)
Considerable attention has been paid of late to the DF-21D anti-ship bal-
listic missile (ASBM). The first of its kind, the DF-21D ASBM combines a
manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle (MARV) with a terminal guidance system,
has a range of 1,500 kilometres, and is capable of hypersonic (Mach 5 and
above) speeds. (28) This makes the missile potentially effective against slow-
moving carrier battle groups, and has earned the DF-21D the nickname
“the carrier-killer.” According to the US DoD, the DF-21D appears to be a
“workable design” and has been deployed in small numbers, having
achieved “initial operating capability.” (30)
Regarding China’s nuclear strategic forces, the Second Artillery currently
operates approximately 55-65 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),
up from around 20 ICBMs a decade ago. (30) These systems include the silo-
based SS-4/DF-5 Mod 2, as well as the solid-fuelled, road-mobile CSS-
10/DF-31. Improved versions of these ICBMs are expected to be deployed
by the middle of this decade. (31) Additionally, China’s land-based ICBMs are
complimented by a growing number of sea-launched missiles, particularly
the JL-2 SLBMs, of which 24 are currently deployed on two Jin-class SSBNs.
Finally, the PLA has paid considerable attention over the past 15 years to
expanding and improving its capabilities for C4ISR (command, control, com-
munications, computing, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) and
for information operations/information warfare. Developing an advanced
C4ISR system is a high priority for the Chinese military; accordingly, the PLA
has created a separate military communications network using fibre-optic
cable, satellites, microwave relays, and long-range high frequency radio. The
PLA has also acquired several types of unmanned aerial vehicles and ex-
panded its constellation of space-based systems, including the Haiyang, Yao-
gan, and Huanjin remote-sensing satellites, the Beidou navigation satellite
system (which just came online in late 2011), and the Fenghuo military
communications satellite. (32) In addition, similar to the US Army’s “Future
Force Warrior” program, the PLA is reportedly experimenting with digitising
its ground forces, right down to outfitting the individual soldier with elec-
tronic gadgetry in order to provide him with real-time tactical C4ISR.
Concurrently, the PLA is expanding its capabilities to wage “offensive in-
formation warfare” (OIW). OIW is intended to disable or degrade an
enemy’s C4ISR system to such an extent that he is either deterred from
fighting or, once at war, that his ability and resolve to fight back is weak-
ened to the brink of capitulation. OIW is seen as a critical new development
in the PLA’s emerging war-fighting capabilities. The PLA is developing oper-
ating concepts of “integrated network electronic warfare,” an amalgam of
operations including electronic warfare (such as jamming the enemy’s com-
munications and intelligence-gathering assets), computer network opera-
tions (such as hacking or disrupting the enemy’s computers and cyberspace
operations), and even physical attacks on the enemy’s C4ISR infrastructure
(strikes against sensors such as AWACS and satellites, or against informa-
tion nodes such as command posts). (33) The PLA has established special in-
formation warfare units to carry out attacks on enemy computer networks,
in order to blind and disrupt an adversary’s C4I systems.
In many instances, the PLA’s efforts at “informatisation” have benefited
from leveraging advances and improvements in China’s rapidly expand-
ing commercial information technology sector. China’s military telecom-
munications satellites, its Beidou navigation satellite system, and its Yao-
gan series of reconnaissance satellites are all based on commercial satel-
lite technologies, for example. In particular, many of the technologies
being developed for commercial remote sensing satellites, such as
charge-coupled device cameras, multispectral scanners, and synthetic
aperture radar imagers, have obvious applications for military systems.
Similarly, much of the hardware and skill base for conducting informa-
tion warfare is dual-use in nature, and the Chinese military has benefited
from piggy-backing on developments and growth in the country’s com-
mercial IT industry.
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Professionalisation and training of PLA
personnel (34)
China is combining its force modernisation efforts with actions intended
to increase the professionalisation and jointness of the PLA. PLA officers
and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) are receiving increased training
and education, while recent military exercises have emphasised amphibi-
ous warfare with limited multi-service participation. PLAAF and PLANAF
training regimens increasingly devote more time to supporting amphibious
operations, while PLA ground forces are increasingly integrating training
and exercises with maritime, airborne, and special operations forces. (35)
China has been improving personnel quality along several dimensions.
One is improving the educational background of new officers and enlisted
personnel. Today, to be inducted into the PLA as an enlisted person, recruits
from rural areas must have at least graduated from middle school, and
those from urban areas must have graduated from a vocational high school
or three-year technical college, or be enrolled in a four-year college. (36)
Officers in the PLA used to be drawn from the ranks of enlisted person-
nel. Some were promoted directly to become officers while others were
sent to one of the PLA’s 30 or so military academies. Direct promotions
have ended, however, and those remaining officers who were directly pro-
moted have been required to attend military academies. More impor-
tantly, approximately half of the PLA’s officers are now recruited from civil-
ian universities, which are regarded as providing higher quality education
than the PLA’s academies. (37)
Another aspect of the PLA’s efforts to improve the quality of its person-
nel is the creation of an NCO corps. The vast majority of these are enlisted
personnel who volunteer to reenlist after the end of their initial two-year
commitment. As of 2008, all NCOs must have at least a high-school edu-
cation and a “certificate of professional qualification.” Diplomas from vo-
cational high schools and technical colleges are considered acceptable, but
those NCOs who are not high school graduates or who do not have a
diploma from a vocational high school or technical college are sent to PLA
academies or to civilian colleges, research institutes, and industrial colleges
to receive the requisite training. In addition to satisfying these minimum
education requirements, NCOs receive further education and training
throughout their careers in the PLA, and senior NCOs (those who reach the
top two of six total NCO grades) are required to have a degree from a
three-year technical college. (38)
In addition to improving the quality of its soldiers and officers, the PLA is
attempting to improve the quality of its training by increasing the realism,
complexity, and “jointness” of its exercises. Traditionally, training was con-
ducted in small units belonging to a single branch (e.g., infantry, frigates, or
fighter aircraft), and was performed in benign conditions that included fa-
miliar terrain, daylight, and good weather. Moreover, training exercises were
done either without an opposing force or with opposing forces whose ac-
tions were predetermined and briefed to the force being trained ahead of
time. Now, however, training is routinely conducted on unfamiliar terrain, at
night or in bad weather, and against opposing forces whose actions are not
predetermined. The frequency of combined-arms (different branches within
a single service) and joint (different services training together) training has
also increased, as has the scale of the exercises. Some training areas now
have dedicated opposition forces that simulate the tactics of potential ad-
versaries and are even allowed to defeat the visiting unit. Finally, rigorous
evaluation and post-exercise critiques have become an integral part of PLA
training, with units required to meet standardised performance benchmarks
or else undergo remedial training. (39)
Conclusions
China has been engaged in an ambitious, concerted, and methodical
transformation of its armed forces since the late 1990s. China’s recent mil-
itary acquisitions, as well as its current R&D efforts, particularly its empha-
sis on “trump card” weapons for asymmetric warfare, have been critical de-
velopments in the upgrading of its war-fighting capabilities. At the same
time, the PLA has made considerable progress over the last 15 years in en-
hancing the professionalism of its military personnel, and in expanding its
training and making it both more realistic and more joint. Consequently,
China has noticeably improved its military capabilities in several specific
areas – particularly missile attack, precision-strike, power projection at sea
and in the air, and joint operations. The Chinese armed forces have also
made significant advances in exploiting informatisation, in promoting the
development of advanced weaponry, and in accelerating the pace of mili-
tary modernisation, all of which create new levers of military power for the
PLA. Ultimately, the PLA seeks to turn itself into a modern, network-en-
abled fighting force, capable of projecting sustained power throughout the
Asia-Pacific region. If successful, China’s military modernisation drive will
give the country the potential, in the US Department of Defense’s words,
to “pose credible threats to modern militaries operating in the region.” (40)
At the same time, the PLA continues to suffer from a number of deficien-
cies and weaknesses that limit its ability to constitute a major military
threat to advanced militaries such as the United States armed forces. In
the first place, for all of its talk of becoming a more networked military, the
PLA is still decidedly a platform-centric force that is still in the process of
becoming more network-enabled. Second, despite more than 15 years of
continuous defence spending increases and at least a decade of aggressive
acquisitions on the part of the PLA, the bulk of the Chinese military re-
mains relatively backward. Overall, barely 25 percent of the PLA’s fighter
aircraft, 25 percent of its surface combatants, 40 percent of its surface-to-
air missiles, and 55 percent of its submarine fleet are deemed by the US
Department of Defense to be modern. (41) Even many of the PLA’s most re-
cently acquired systems, such as the J-10 fighter jet, the Yuan-class sub-
marine, and the Luyang-II destroyer, although advanced by the PLA’s stan-
dards, are basically 1980s-era weapons systems. The J-10 fighter jet, for in-
stance, is basically equivalent to the F-16C, which entered service in the
mid-1980s. Even equipment that China has acquired from Russia – such as
Su-30MKK fighters, Sovremenny-class destroyers, and Kilo-class sub-
marines – are hardly transformational, game-changing systems. Finally, it
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is worth remembering that the bulk of the PLA ground forces are still
equipped with old or obsolete weaponry; only about a third of the PLA’s
7,500 main battle tanks are the relatively modern Type-96 and Type-99 –
the remainder being Type-59 and Type-69 tanks based on the 1950s-era
Soviet T-54. Other types of modern ground systems – including infantry
fighting vehicles, self-propelled artillery gun systems, helicopters, anti-tank
guided missiles, and surface-to-air missile systems – are only gradually
being introduced in modest numbers. (42) In sum, the capabilities gap be-
tween the PLA and the US military remains wide, even as the PLA is posing
new problems for regional militaries that do not have the aggregate power
or budget of the US armed forces.
Moreover, the technology gap between China’s defence industry and the
leading Western arms producers remains significant in several critical
areas. This is particularly apparent in China’s continued reliance upon for-
eign suppliers for propulsion systems, especially engines for its naval
forces, as well as turbofan jet engines used to power modern military air-
craft and transports. China’s largely indigenously-built J-10 fighter, for ex-
ample, still uses AL-31FN engines imported from Russia. (43) One should
also keep in the mind that many advanced weapons programs, such as its
aircraft carrier or its J-20 combat aircraft, are still in the developmental
stage, and actual deployment remains years, perhaps even a decade or
more, away. Additionally, the US DoD has reported that the JL-2 SLBM has
experienced a “number of problems,” and that its in-service date remains
“uncertain.” (44) Finally, China continues to lag far behind the West in areas
such as C4I architectures and surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities.
Operationally, it is important to note that the PLA remains overwhelm-
ingly a ground forces-dominated military. Top leadership positions in the
Chinese armed forces are dominated by the Army – and the Army is made
up mostly of modestly-armed infantry troops, at that. In short, large seg-
ments of the PLA today remain incapable of much in the way of mobility
or expeditionary capacities. The PLA still lacks the logistical and lift capac-
ity, either by sea or by air, required for projecting force far beyond its bor-
ders or immediate ocean areas. It still has the capability to sea- and airlift
only two or three regiments of soldiers and marines at any given time, and
the PLA still possesses little in the way of sustained logistical abilities, par-
ticularly over long distances (although the PLA Navy continues to expand
its fleet of amphibious and logistics vessels, including the launch of its first
hospital ship in 2010). Finally, the PLA “continues to face deficiencies in
inter-service cooperation and actual experience in joint exercises and com-
bat operations,” making the attainment of a joint operations capability –
let alone an integrated joint operations capability – rather remote for the
time being. (45)
All these problems aside, however, it is undeniable that the Chinese mil-
itary has made impressive gains in upgrading and improving its military ca-
pabilities over the past 15 years. Moreover, the pace of this modernisation
process does not yet appear to have abated. And while PLA modernisation
has not been across-the-board, it may also not be necessary for it to con-
stitute a modern fighting force. Many have speculated that the Chinese are
basically engaged in building an “army within an army,” that is, a relatively
small force – approximately a dozen division- or brigade-sized rapid reac-
tion units, including three airborne and four amphibious or marine divi-
sions, as well as special operations forces – equipped and trained to carry
out rapid attacks. The forces will be supported in turn by the more ad-
vanced elements of the rest of the PLA, such as precision-strike missile
forces, fourth-generation fighters, modern surface and submarine forces,
and surface-to-air missiles systems, all backed up by an increasingly capa-
ble C4ISR network and an offensive information warfare capability. Such a
force would mostly likely be used to attack and defeat Taiwan, while also
deterring or defeating US intervention on Taipei’s behalf. Such capabilities
could also be applied to other regional contingencies, such as territorial
disputes in the South China Sea. (46)
So while Chinese military power may still pale in comparison to the US
armed forces, the strength of the PLA relative to its likely local competitors
in the Asia-Pacific region has increased significantly, and will likely con-
tinue to grow over the next ten to 20 years. As a result, China is definitely
gaining an edge over other regional militaries in the Asia-Pacific, particu-
larly Taiwan and perhaps even Japan and India. (47)
Naturally, many of Beijing’s neighbours have looked upon China’s grow-
ing hard power and its “creeping assertiveness” in the South China Sea
with a certain amount of trepidation. Some are attempting to hedge
against a rising China by engaging in their own military build-ups. In par-
ticular, India and several nations in Southeast Asia have over the past
decade or so been engaged in their own often intensive efforts to mod-
ernise their armed forces. As a result, these countries have added new or
expanded military capabilities that can be directed against any potential
“China threat.” India is in the midst of upgrading its navy, acquiring sev-
eral large surface combatants – including two aircraft carriers – and more
than a dozen new submarines (both nuclear- and conventionally pow-
ered), as well as buying hundreds of new fighter jets. Singapore, Malaysia,
Indonesia, and Vietnam are all acquiring submarines and new warships,
modern anti-ship cruise missiles, fourth-generation-plus fighter jets, and
stand-off air-launched weapons. The challenge to Beijing, of course, is
that it may be instigating an arms race where it does not seek one, espe-
cially with regard to India, which increasingly sees itself in a rivalry with
China for great-power status in the Asia-Pacific. And even if the smaller
states in Southeast Asia cannot hope to match China’s military force, they
at least aspire to blunt this power, particularly when it comes to their own
claims in the South China Sea.
In sum, it is readily apparent that China has made significant – perhaps
even unexpected – progress in building up its military power over the past
15 years. And because China’s rise is so recently tainted with a growing
self-assertiveness (both verbally and policy-wise) bordering on belliger-
ence, its growing military capabilities have injected new uncertainties
into the regional security calculus. At the same time, Chinese military
power still possesses several weak links that mitigate its effectiveness. It
could be argued that China is growing in hard power just enough to po-
tentially destabilise regional security – particularly if it chooses to use
military power to press its claims and interests; at the same time, it is not
yet powerful enough militarily to actually resolve these issues. This is, to
say the least, a delicate balance that is fraught with peril and the poten-
tial for conflict.
N o . 2 0 1 1 / 4  •  c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s 15
42. “Ground forces,” www.sinodefence.com/army/default.asp, Sinodefense.com (consulted on 15 Decem-
ber 2011).
43. Evan S. Medeiros et al., A New Direction for China’s Defense Industry, Santa Monica, RAND, 2005, p.
170.
44. OSD, 2011 Report to Congress, op. cit., p. 34.
45. Ibid., p. 27.
46. Timothy Hu, “China – Marching Forward,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 25 April 2007.
47. China now outspends Japan on defence by a factor of nearly two to one, and the PLAN has more de-
stroyers, frigates, and attack submarines than the Japan Maritime Self Defence Force.
Richard Bitzinger – Modernising China’s Military, 1997-2012
